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SIGNATURES OF VIBER SECURE TRAFFIC
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ABSTRACT
Viber is one of the widely used mobile chat application which has over 606 million users on its
platform. Since the recent release of Viber 6.0 in March/April 2016 and its further updates,
Viber provides end-to-end encryption based on Open Whisper Signal security architecture. With
proprietary communication protocol scattered on distributed cluster of servers in different countries
and secure cryptographic primitives, Viber offers a difficult paradigm of traffic analysis. In this
paper, we present a novel methodology of identification of Viber traffic over the network and
established a model which can classify its services of audio and audio/video calls, message chats
including text and voice chats, group messages and file/media sharing. Absolute detection of both
parties of Viber voice and video calls is also demonstrated in our work. Our findings on Viber
traffic signatures are applicable to most recent version of Viber 6.2.2 for android and iOS devices.
Keywords: Viber, Proprietary communication protocol, End-to-end encryption, Traffic analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Viber is one of the popular mobile applications
that allows its users to communicate securely
through internet connectivity on 3/4 G or WiFi.
It is a product of Rakuten Inc. (Rakuten, 1997
(accessed 9-November-2016)) and currently has
more than 606 million users on its platform.
Based on a complex structure of geographically
distant servers, complete communication proto-
col of the Viber is not known. In current ver-
sion of Viber, all of core features are secured
with end to end encryption: voice and video
calls, one-on-one messages, group messages and
media sharing. No known attacks with promis-
ing success rate exist on used encryption algo-
rithm, associated primitives used for authenti-
cation and key establishment protocols. Even
the used keys for content encryption are gen-
erated in such a way that even Viber has no
control over them and track to previously used
keys or future keys doesn’t exist in the design.
In this scenario of strongly build security archi-
tecture, access to the contents of Viber during
the transit over the network is not known to be
possible.
Like any other chat or social media secure
app, analysis of Viber has three dimensions; the
strength analysis of security functions incorpo-
rated in the Viber, platform forensics hosting
the app and black box traffic analysis between
the client and their servers. First two dimen-
sions are beyond the scope of this paper while
third one is our focus here. The detailed analy-
sis of the secure Viber traffic was conducted for
different services offered by Viber and peculiar
signatures of Viber traffic were identified even
in a secure end-to-end encryption scenario.
The taxonomy of internet traffic can be com-
bination of protocols, applications, websites,
and services obscured in a defined byte pat-
terns; data packets and associated layered head-
ers. Even under the concealed arrangements of
SSL driven HTTPS traffic, internet traffic follow
certain pre-defined rules of data encapsulations
related to different protocols/services and their
headers.
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In Viber communication protocol, pattern
of secure connections to heterogeneous clus-
ter of servers including Viber and Amazon
cloud servers is very complex (Marik, Bezpalec,
Kucerak, & Kencl, 2015). With such a scope
where protocol details of communication be-
tween geographically distant located servers and
their clients are not known, analysis of en-
crypted traffic becomes a real challenge. How-
ever, extensive study of network traffic, identifi-
cation of protocols though enforced events, con-
nectivity requests and their acknowledgments,
activity related size of exchanged frames/ pack-
ets and fixed byte patterns were few of tech-
niques used in combination to profile the en-
crypted traffic of Viber.
To reach from unknown to maximally pos-
sible known, a detailed analysis of Viber ser-
vices was carried out in this paper. The com-
munication between the Viber clients to their
servers was studied through series of event
driven scenarios and identification of Viber from
the traffic flowing over a live network was made.
The further classification of Viber traffic into
text/chat messages, file sharing, voice and video
sessions is successfully demonstrated in this pa-
per.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly covers the account of relevant work done
so far on different dimensions of analysis of so-
cial media applications. Section 3 elaborates
our main work in which mechanism of traf-
fic interception, its filtering and identification
of voice/video communication and chat conver-
sation is given. The accurate detection flow
and classification of each Viber service is sum-
marized through a flow chart in this Section.
Events of chat conversations studied in relation
to payload sizes and results of their behaviour
analysis is also described in this Section. The
Paper is finally concluded in Section 4.
2. RELATED WORK
Traffic analysis of Internet has been a well
studied area. The evolution of robust net-
works, new protocols and changing encapsu-
lation techniques attracted the research com-
munity to carry out intensive studies for clas-
sification of network traffic (Chen, Jin, Cao,
& Li, 2010), (F. Zhang, He, Liu, & Bridges,
2011), (J. Zhang, Chen, Xiang, Zhou, & Vasi-
lakos, 2013) and (Callado et al., 2009). The
detailed analysis of traffic classification, its his-
torical context, breakthroughs achieved so far
and technical reasons which are hindering the
accuracy and effectiveness of classification tech-
niques are summarized in (Dainotti, Pescape, &
Claffy, 2012).
The actual problem of traffic analysis is
converged to anonymity of networks (Gilad
& Herzberg, 2012), encrypted contents (Coull
& Dyer, 2014) and secure cloud based ap-
plications. Number of techniques of traf-
fic analysis were introduced, like traffic flow
records (Chakravarty, Barbera, Portokalidis,
Polychronakis, & Keromytis, 2014), band-
width estimations (Chakravarty, Stavrou, &
Keromytis, 2010) and machine learning tech-
niques (Nguyen & Armitage, 2008). A compre-
hensive survey of these classification techniques
with a focus on encrypted traffic was conducted
recently in (Velan, Cˇerma´k, Cˇeleda, & Drasˇar,
2015). In succession, several studies were car-
ried out to profile the secure social media appli-
cations like Skype, Whatsapp, Viber, and Sig-
nal.
Being the pioneer in secure VoIP chat appli-
cation, Skype received the focused attention of
forensic community. Amongst the recent works,
(Adami, Callegari, Giordano, Pagano, & Pepe,
2012) used both statistical test methods and sig-
nature based procedures to classify the signal-
ing and data traffic including voice / video calls
and file transfers. (Yuan, Du, Chen, Wang, &
Xue, 2014) studied the UDP flows of Skype to
correctly identify the Skype traffic over the net-
work.
A recent promising work on analysis of 20 an-
droid apps covered three possible scenarios of
data on device, data in transit over the network
and data on server storage (Walnycky, Bag-
gili, Marrington, Moore, & Breitinger, 2015).
Evidentiary traces of passwords, screen shots,
video, text messages audio, GPS location, pro-
file pictures were found to be recoverable from
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smartphone or exploitable by malicious actor
over the network. Besides stored data forensics
of apps, focus was on re-construction/ partial
reconstruction of traffic through plain contents
of these messaging applications.
WhatsApp, being the most popular choice
in recent years, gained the maximum attention
of forensic community. The most recent work
was presented in (Karpisek, Baggili, & Bre-
itinger, 2015) where authors analyzed network
level traffic of WhatsApp and obtained its foren-
sics artifacts. The start point of the analysis
was from Whatpps API where authors were able
to access mobile phone OS. Having access in a
purely development environment, client-server
communication was analyzed in detail. The
sessions between the client to server or server
to client were attempted to decrypt. Through
signaling messages, types of Codecs were also
found. However, with recent changes in security
architecture of WhatsApp protocol (i.e. end-
to-end encryption), results of this paper needs
re-evaluation.
Viber is known for its obscurity of com-
munication protocol. The fundamental work
on Viber security analysis was provided
in (Appelman, Bosma, & Veerman, 2011). Since
then the security architecture of Viber has gone
through number of phases and the latest ver-
sion of Viber is providing end-to-end encryp-
tion for voice and video calls. Similarly, chat
messages and file sharing services are also en-
crypted. A recent comprehensive work on Viber
traffic analysis was presented in (Marik et al.,
2015) which discussed observation-based anal-
ysis of Viber communication protocol between
servers and clients, pattern classification de-
pending upon payloads and vulnerability assess-
ment. The survey of this paper was clearly dis-
tributed between two distinct periods of Viber
until 2014, when a number of security breaches
existed in the design and Viber after April
2014 when client-server communication was en-
crypted. The applicability of analysis of this
work is no more valid for Viber 6.0 (released
around March/April 2016) and beyond as the
current design is based on Openwhisper secu-
rity architecture which ensures end-to-end en-
cryption.
The analysis carried out in our work covers
upto latest version of Viber 6.2.2 and all re-
sults were verified for both android and iOS
platforms. Behaviour of traffic of Viber was ex-
tensively studied and signatures of Viber were
identified based on observed patterns in traffic.
A large number of events of Viber communica-
tion were stimulated to draw conclusions about
the traffic classification. The reliability and ac-
curacy of traffic classification was increased by
mixing the techniques of port based identifica-
tion, tracking the fixed byte patterns as identi-
fiers and monitoring the state flows within data
and control traffic. Through necessary screen
shots and process flow charts, detection of Viber
traffic over the network and its further classifica-
tion into voice and video chats, file sharing and
text messaging is demonstrated in this work.
3. VISUALIZATION OF
VIBER TRAFFIC
This section elaborates the methodology of in-
terception of Viber traffic and its further filter-
ing to accurately identify the Viber voice/video
communications and chat conversations. To do
so, a large number of traffic samples were col-
lected by using different mobile devices running
commonly used operating systems (e.g. An-
droid/iOS). The accurate detection of Viber
traffic over the network along with all services
was achieved through deep analysis.
The security architecture of Viber is no
more totally opaque and even the latest up-
dates of security design are available on Viber
website (Rakuten, 1997 (accessed 30-August-
2016)). Now we summarize the contents of
Viber security overview here. The most recent
changes in the security architecture of Viber
started with Viber 6.0, after which all of Viber’s
services were secured. The end-to-end encryp-
tion is provided for voice and video calls, one-
on-one chats and group messages, secondary
devices (other devices running Viber with the
same account) and media sharing. The core of
security engine is Salsa 20 stream cipher which
is used for payload encryption. The secure ses-
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sions are established using Elliptic-Curve Diffie-
Hellman key-exchange algorithm and HMAC-
SHA256 for authentication. The storage of en-
cryption keys is only maintained on the client
smartphones and not even the Viber servers
have access to them.
Driving the motivation from Open Whisper
Systems Signal application; Viber’s security ar-
chitecture is based on the double ratchet pro-
tocol which provides forward and backward se-
crecy. If a key of any session is compromised,
past and future messages cannot be decrypted.
A secure session is established between the two
users once and then unlimited number of mes-
sages can be exchanged in either direction. Sim-
ilarly, for secure call (voice and video) sessions,
session keys are established which are then used
to convert RTP streams to SRTP via Salsa en-
cryption algorithm. The file sharing is also end-
to-end secure.
For group messaging, all members of the
group share a secret common key which is gen-
erated by group creator and shared with other
members of the group through secure sessions.
As per the claims of Viber designers, not even
Viber has any visibility to these group keys. Ad-
ditionally, mechanism of identity authentication
is incorporated in Viber through which string of
48 decimal characters is matched by caller and
the callee during a live call. This authentication
procedure protects the users form threat of any
man-in-the-middle possibility. The only known
limitation of Viber till date is related to iOS
pictures and video sharing service which is not
end-to-end encrypted. However, the designers
of Viber security commit to patch this vulnera-
bility in near future.
3.1 Setup For Network Traffic
Collection
This section explains the layout of our setup
to collect Viber traffic over the network for our
analysis. As shown in Figure 1, a TP-Link wire-
less router was connected to the Layer 3 switch
with internet connection terminated on it as
well. In this scenario, TP-Link wireless router
provided the internet in its vicinity. A mirroring
port of the switch was configured to collect the
entire traffic of the port to which the TP-Link
router was connected. The data of mirroring
port was fed to our proprietary setup to ana-
lyze the traffic of the mobile.
TP-Link 
Wireless Router
Layer 3 Switch
M
irro
rin
g
 P
o
rt
Target Mobile
Traffic Analyzer
Network Topology
Figure 1. Network traffic collection
On successful configuration of layout of cap-
turing and mirroring the traffic, the target mo-
bile was connected to TP-Link router and we
started getting the captured packets on the traf-
fic analyzer. Any traffic analyzer like Wireshark
can be used to capture the entire traffic going in
and out from the mobile device and to save as
pcap-file for detailed analysis. First, we demon-
strate the analysis of Viber voice/video commu-
nication and then the chat messages.
3.2 Viber Voice and Video Call
In this Section, study of Viber calls identifi-
cation and complete flow of our classification
methodology is discussed. It was observed that
for every session of voice or voice/video call,
Viber converted the RTP stream of voice/ video
to securer stream of SRTP while using Salsa20
encryption algorithm. The sessions between
the Viber caller to server and server to callee
were all encrypted and communication with dis-
tributed IPs made the analysis further com-
plex. However, with known and observed pecu-
liarities of TCP and UDP flows, byte patterns
and tracking their flows, successful identifica-
tion of calls and their further classification was
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achieved.
3.2.1 Call Detection
After the detailed analysis of thousands of traf-
fic samples, it was found that whenever the
caller initiated a voice call, the voice messages
first communicated via server between the caller
and the callee. During the call, the encrypted
signaling messages were exchanged either on
UDP or TCP to establish P2P connection be-
tween the two users. This phenomena will be
demonstrated later. On getting the traffic dump
as shown in Figure 2, our first task was to detect
and filter out the Viber communication between
the two entities of interest.
Figure 2. Unfiltered traffic
Viber usually communicates over UDP ports
7985, 7987, 5243 and 9785 for the voice calls and
the same was observed over the entire period of
our study. By applying the filters on these ports
along with the IP address of the target mobile
(i.e 192.168.15.162), we observed two distinct
communication streams on port 7985 as shown
in Figure 3 and on port 7987 as shown in Fig-
ure 4.
The target mobile tried to establish the con-
nection on port 7985 and 7987 simultaneously
as depicted in Figure 5 but only succeeded to es-
tablish the connection on port 7985. We would
also like to note that only 4 packets were being
exchanged to port 7987 of the Viber server dur-
ing the entire voice session. It could be safely
inferred that attempts of establishing connec-
tion on multiple server ports were made and re-
liable connection was achieved on one of these
Figure 3. Traffic with target IP and server port
7985
UDP server ports.
We repeatedly observed that the caller tried
to establish the P2P connection with the
callee directly and logical interpretation of
these attempts could be to release the load of
voice/video traffic over the server and utilize the
resources of individual clients. Another impor-
tant observation was related to fixed port used
by the caller for establishing connection with
Viber server and during its continuous attempts
for P2P connection with the callee as well. As
shown in Figure 6, the target mobile already
connected to the server while exchanging the
voice messages with IP 52.58.255.70 via server,
was also trying to establish the P2P connection
with the callee having IP 43.245.8.10 on mul-
tiple ports including 54761, 54762, 54763 and
54764. These IP and ports of the other party
were definitely sent over the encrypted commu-
nication with server (on either TCP or UDP)
Figure 4. Traffic with target IP and server port
7987
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Figure 5. Connection requests from target IP
to multiple UDP server ports
otherwise it was not possible for the target mo-
bile to initiate such direct messages to the other
user. Similarly , UDP port of 53519 was as-
signed to the caller during its connection with
the Server and remained fixed during its P2P
attempts.
Figure 6. Multiple P2P connection requests
3.2.2 Behavior Analysis of Viber
Voice/Video Call
Once the Viber call was identified and segre-
gated from the entire traffic, the behavior anal-
ysis was performed to distinguish between the
voice and video call or switch over events be-
tween the voice and video and vice-versa. It
was very challenging for us to implement the ef-
ficient, reliable and accurate algorithm to differ-
entiate between these two events specially while
they are changing frequently during a single ses-
sion.
We observed that the Viber operated nor-
mally at the rate of 40 to 90 UDP packets
per second with different payload sizes. We
focused our analysis on voice and video traffic
payloads exclusively through thousands of trig-
gered events with extensive switch over from
voice to video and vice-versa. Our finding re-
vealed that the payload size of a voice was nor-
mally greater than 18 bytes and less than 300
bytes with possibility of little variations. Sim-
ilarly, packets with size greater than 750 bytes
and less than 1400 bytes were seen frequently in
a video call.
With slow internet connection, the video call
turned into voice call immediately but few pack-
ets of UDP payload of size greater than 750 were
also observed to be exchanged. We catered dif-
ferent corner cases as well in our algorithm to
identify the event of voice or video calls cor-
rectly. To achieve accuracy of our findings, fo-
cus of our research was to identify following pa-
rameters in Viber conversations.
1. Duration of the call.
2. Correct call event (i.e. voice or video).
Table 1 shows the frequency of payload sizes
of two different ranges in both the voice and
video conversations of each side. The results
were tested and verified on thousands of voice
and video call events.
Figure 7 shows the P2P voice conversation be-
tween the caller and the callee and event of call
switch over from voice to video. Before packet
number 4664, the voice call was established and
event of switch over from voice to video took
place at packet number 4667. UDP payload size
of 1116 was observed to be sent at this instance
from IP 43.245.8.10 to the target mobile having
IP 192.168.15.162. From here on, 30 to 50% of
the packets/second having size greater than 18
bytes and less than 300 bytes and 50 to 70% of
the packets/second having size greater than 750
bytes and less than 1400 bytes were sent from
IP 43.245.8.10 to the target mobile. During the
voice call, all packets of length greater than 18
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Event Payload Size (PS) Payload Size (PS)
18 < PS < 300 750 < PS < 1400
Voice call Yes 100% No
Video call Yes (30% to 50%) Yes (50% to 70%)
Table 1. Payload sizes for Voice and Video calls
bytes and less than 300 bytes were exchanged
between the two parties.
Figure 7. Voice call turns into video
3.2.3 Flow Chart for the Identification
of Viber Call Events and
Duration
The flow chart as shown in Figure 8 gives the
implementation model of our idea to detect
Viber voice and voice/video conversations accu-
rately. The behavior analysis on massive num-
ber of traffic samples was carried out to define
the discrete steps of our flow chart. The pro-
cess described in this flow can serve to be main
framework of developing signatures of Viber
traffic even it is encrypted.
Once the incoming traffic was intercepted by
the packet receiver, it sent the stream to Viber
detection component to filter out Viber call traf-
fic. This traffic was then sent to Viber Ana-
lyzer to identify the voice or video traffic. The
design of Viber analyzer incorporated our all
findings on voice calls, video calls and switch
over between voice to video and video to voice
events. The Viber analyzer module continu-
ously extracted all IPs and their corresponding
ports from the received traffic and maintained
the dictionary.
Viber detection component was responsible
to first decode initial session of Viber traffic by
looking at the UDP ports including 7985, 7987,
5243 and 9785. When a P2P session was ob-
served to be established, Viber detection com-
ponent decoded the Viber traffic by trying to
find out the hash of source IP with source Port
or destination IP with destination Port in the
internal dictionary of extracted IPs and ports
maintained by the Viber analyzer. When the
traffic arrived at Viber analyzer, it extracted
client IP and client port to perform the follow-
ing operations:-
1. Maintained its own dictionary of client IP
and client port along with counters for dif-
ferent types of packets, call events, and tim-
ing markers.
2. Sent the client IP and client port to Viber
detection component for P2P session iden-
tification of Viber call traffic.
When the first packet arrived, it initially
triggered the event log component to check
voice or video on the basis of payload
length of the packet. Now, for every sin-
gle packet, the Viber analyzer examined for
switch over event between voice to video or
vice-versa. After studying million of pack-
ets in consonance to triggered events, fixed
patterns of traffic were determined which
made our detection mechanism accurate.
Similarly, timing component of our model
clearly identified the events duration, their
start and termination instances.
c© 2017 ADFSL Page 115
JDFSL VxNx Signatures of Viber Secure Traffic
Figure 8. Viber call identification flow chart
3.3 Viber Chat Conversation
Events Identification
Viber normally uses TCP ports 5242 and
4244 for providing chat services to the
clients. We observed that a user always
made a persistent connection with the
Viber server on the above specified ports
until the user signed out or the internet
connection was disturbed. We defined fol-
lowing events of chat conversation to each
of the chat participants for Viber:
(a) The user was typing a message.
(b) Message sent but not delivered to the
other user (the other user was oﬄine).
(c) Message sent and delivered but not
seen by the other user (the other user
was online but the message was still
unread).
(d) Message sent and seen by the other
user (the other user read the message).
(e) Message received but not seen by the
user (the user was online but the mes-
sage was still unread).
(f) Message received and seen by the user
(the user read the message).
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Event TCP Payload From To Freq
Size
User is typing 92 bytes client server variable
Message sent but 98 bytes server client atomic
not delivered 84 bytes client server atomic
Message sent and 98 bytes server client atomic
delivered but not 84 bytes client server atomic
seen by recipient 119 bytes server client atomic
64 bytes client server atomic
Message Sent and 98 bytes server client atomic
seen by recipient 84 bytes client server atomic
119 bytes server client atomic
64 bytes client server atomic
105 bytes server client atomic
103 bytes client server atomic
Message Received 68 bytes client server atomic
but not seen
by recipient
Message Received 68 bytes client server atomic
and seen 103 bytes client server atomic
100 bytes server client atomic
Table 2. Identification of chat conversation events
After conducting extensive behavior analy-
sis of the chat conversation between the two
users, we were able to identify all of these
events of a particular chat conversation.
For each event, a pattern of TCP pack-
ets with constant payloads was observed as
mentioned in the Table 2.
Possible events of chat conversation were
generated and behaviour of traffic was de-
termined by analyzing client-server connec-
tion establishment, tracking flows of traf-
fic, timing of exchange of fixed byte pat-
terns, payload size and frequency of con-
nection requests and responses. A reliable
set of parameters defining the Viber chat
conversation and its different events were
then used to develop a tool. The devel-
oped utility was tested over the network for
accuracy and reliability of identification of
Viber chat messages and their event wise
classification.
For each received packet, an acknowledge-
ment packet was sent exclusively from the
other side. However, the order of these
acknowledgement packets in a particular
event may vary. Voice chat messages,
group messages, and media sharing (pic-
ture, video, and file) chats also worked in
the same way and their patterns were cor-
rectly identified using the parameters out-
lined in Table 2.
As mentioned above, the client always
made a persistent connection with the
Viber server. We observed that following
messages were exchanged after regular in-
tervals to keep the server-client connection
alive.
(a) Packet containing 101 bytes of TCP
payload was sent from client to server.
(b) Packet containing 76 bytes of TCP
payload wass sent from server to
client.
Our findings on classification of chat events
with respect to payload sizes and correct
event identification were tested over thou-
sands of traffic samples of Viber.
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3.4 Summary of our Findings
In developing the signatures of Viber traffic
and its services, we were able to:
(a) Identify traffic of Viber over the net-
work with accuracy.
(b) Classification of voice calls, video calls
and switch over between voice to video
and video to voice.
(c) Identification of IPs of both parties of
voice or video calls.
(d) Classification of chats including text
chats, voice chats, group chats and
media sharing during chats.
Besides the limitation of encrypted con-
tents, the identification of both parties for
messaging/chat service was not possible
in current version of Viber which can be
termed as limitation of traffic analysis ob-
served so far; however, the same can be
a dimension of future work for other re-
searchers of community. Similarly, analy-
sis of other messaging applications can be
undertaken by forensics community based
on our demonstrated methodology. It
is important to mention that new secu-
rity patches and updates in communica-
tion protocol of any social media app en-
tails re-verification of previous analysis re-
sults. We consider it a continuous process
both for the designers of proprietary mes-
saging/chat applications and for forensics
community.
4. CONCLUSION
In this work, we demonstrated a reliable
framework of identification of secure Viber
traffic over the IP network and its further
classification in to voice calls, voice/video
calls, chat messages (text and voice), group
messages, and media sharing. Our anal-
ysis is considered to be the most recent
one after the release of Viber 6.0 around
March/April 2016, which provided end-to-
end encryption and authentication against
man-in-the-middle attacks. Our results are
applicable to the latest version of Viber un-
til 31 August 2016.
Against the opaque communication proto-
col of Viber, a combination of variant tech-
niques of traffic classification was used to
develop a model which correctly profiled
the Viber services. We incorporated port
and IP based filtering, UDP and TCP ports
based flow tracking, extensive analysis of
byte patterns, payload sizes and their fre-
quency in relation to triggered events, pe-
culiarities in server-client or client-server
requests vis--vis their responses, the persis-
tence of established sessions and their tim-
ings. We were able to map our findings
on network level IP traffic successfully and
verified their accuracy for android and iOS
platforms.
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